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At the Intersection of Literature, Philosophy, and Ethics:
Axiology Through the Genre of Literary Fiction
"All great literature is inherently philosophical.” ~ Santayana

On The Danger of Subjugating Literature to Extraneous Pursuits

Philosophers approaching the subject of defining literature as philosophy must be aware of the
legitimate concerns raised by those who study literature. We begin by turning to the work of
Lowry Nelson, Jr. and Peter Lamarque, both of whom are rightfully skeptical of those who
might hijack literature in the service of ends that are clearly beyond the scope of aesthetics.
Nelson believes that literature is art, a production of the imagination, and "its works must be
considered in their individual integrity" (37). For example, Nelson, as a proponent of Kantian
aesthetics, believes that to force literature in the service of philosophy is to bastardize its
aesthetic essence as purposive without a purpose, diverting it from its inherent goal of fulfilling
its wholeness, form, or the "implications of its subject matter," and directing it to the
inauthentic purposes of "practical or moral activity or in the proofs of logic, epistemology,
and metaphysics" (37). Literature should not be relegated to the task of pursuing any
secondary goals beyond fulfilling its own unique aesthetic nature, for as Nelson reasons,
Just as we would not turn over sculpture to the geologist, painting to the interior
designer, or music to the acoustician, so we would not surrender literature to the
ideologue, the psychologist, the preacher, the linguist, the rhetorician, the cultural
historian, or the anti-metaphysical meta-metaphysician (43).

Lamarque shares this concern, and while he defines literature as "fine writing of an
imaginative, creative kind imbued with moral seriousness," he nevertheless remains cautious
and skeptical of the popular trend to utilize literature for purposes which it clearly was not
intended. "There is a danger," writes Lamarque, "that by trying to assimilate literature into
philosophy, the features that make literature distinct will become diluted" (449). Responding to
these legitimate points of concern, the purpose of this essay is to argue for an understanding of
literature as a form of philosophy that is, first and foremost, a work of art. Beyond merely
suggesting the inclusion of literature in philosophy, viewing literature as the ally of philosophy in
the pursuit of understanding the good, moral life, and thereby risking diluting its distinctive and
defining characteristics, I show that literature as art is always already philosophical in its nature.
With this line of thought, I intend to expand and broaden the scope of philosophy, most
particularly with respect to the realm of moral philosophy, or the realm of ethical thinking
(axiology). We find the most profound explication of this notion in the philosophy of
Schopenhauer, who boldly argues that literature (as art) is philosophical. For as he reasons, both
literature (art) and philosophy work toward the same ends, namely, both attempt to solve the
ultimate issues of existence. There is a contemporary counterpart to this line of thinking in
the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum, who traces the origins of such a notion to Aristotelian
thought. Nussbaum states the following regarding the important interconnection between
literature and philosophy and the potential for us to enhance our modes of ethical discourse by
attending to their interrelatedness:
If we wish to develop a human ethical philosophy along Aristotelian lines, I suggest
that we would do well to study narrative and emotional structures of novels, viewing them
as forms of Aristotelian thinking (Nussbaum 1990 391).

Herein, I focus on three interrelated topics: (1) Literature as an art form that is in its
essence philosophical; (2) Literature as an art form that reveals truth in the form of perceptual
knowledge, or "cognitive emotionality, which is an autonomous form of knowledge; and
(3) Literature as philosophically inspiring our effective and legitimate thinking on moral
issues. 1 suggest that engaging literature as a philosophical endeavor proves more rewarding
from the perspective of moral discourse than traditional methods of philosophical speculation
found in formal, deductive, treatises on morals. These form of discourse, functioning in the form
of abstract argumentative treatise, exclusively concerned with rules and abstract principles, tend to
limit or exclude outright the creative, imaginative, and emotion aspects of our existence. Ethics
must strive in the most effective manner to inspire authentic moments of moral comportment
by closing the divide between theory and practice, which includes thoughtfully reconfiguring the
traditional theoria-praxis model. Importantly, the novel, as a genre of literary fiction holds the
unique potential to inspire authentic moral discourse on an expansive interpersonal level, because,
as Nussbaum suggests, literature more effectively traverses the boundaries of time, race, culture,
and gender than traditional philosophy or religious writings.

On Defining Literature as "Art" and Defending Art as "Philosophy”
To begin, a definition of literature as art will be attempted from the perspective of "cognitivism"
while acknowledging the two problems that continue to haunt the philosophical discipline of
aesthetics: (1) the extreme difficulty in overcoming Neo-Wittgenstenian considerations, and
(2) the impossibility of providing a categorical definition of art in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Philosopher Eileen John states the following concerning cognitivism,
"Many works of art, in order to be appreciated and enjoyed as art, call for understanding, as
opposed to shear awe and delight. This understanding often requires cognitively lively or

demanding activity, as we try out ideas, feelings and attitudes important to understanding the
work.” After constructing a Brief, "working" definition of art under which to subsume literature,
I explain why art is by nature philosophical, and in turn, include literature (as art) as fulfilling the
criteria for "art as philosophy."
Definition: If X meets the following criteria, then X is a work of art:
(1) It is an artefact that employs recognizable artistic means and methods for
its construction.
(2) It elicits an "aesthetic response" in the spectator and this "aesthetic response" is an
experience that is both cognitive and emotional, which imparts a perceptual form of
knowledge about the world and its inhabitants.
(3) The cognitive activity is part and parcel of its function as a work of art, and as a result
of this cognitive activity (transmitted via the aesthetic experience), we gain fresh
knowledge, our beliefs are refined, and our understanding is deepened, and what we learn
constitutes our pleasure and aesthetic appreciation of the work of art.
It is possible to locate Sophocles' paradigmatic tragedy (a genre of literature), Oedipus
Rex under this definition, for attending to Aristotle's Poetics we learn that it is a creation
(poiesis) by means of the author, it is a work that elicits an aesthetic experience in the
spectator, producing fear and pity in the moment of the tragic reversal of fate, and, as a result
of kartharsis, which is both horrifying and pleasurable, the spectator's understanding of the
human condition is enhanced. Something must be said at this point about the aesthetic experience
and the claim that art imparts a form of knowledge that is both cognitive and emotional in nature.
Since we are moving toward understanding literature as a form of art that imparts knowledge of a
special type, the most logical place to begin is with the aesthetic philosophy of Kant as presented in

The Critique of Judgment. It will benefit the reader to become familiar with Kant's notion of art,
beauty, and the aesthetic experience before proceeding to an elucidation of cognitivism, which
builds on Kantian foundations, but ultimately graduates beyond the understanding of art we find in
Kant.
For Kant, when we judge something beautiful, we do so in the thralls of a mind-set that
is "disinterested," a state of existence in which we do not desire to possess the object we are
contemplating, nor do we have the power to cognize the object, to make sense of it in terms that are
familiar to us from our everyday ways of understanding the world. The experience of art,
according to Kant, is quite literally beyond our phenomenal understanding of time, space, and
causality. Kant argues that this notion of the "disinterested" experience is at once universal,
necessary, and works in such a way as to imbue the art object with a "purposiveness without
purpose," i.e., the object has the illusion of manifesting a purpose or goal to its activity, when in
fact it has none. This imagined notion of purpose gives us pleasure in the experience of the
work, and, according to Kai Hammermeister, "The notion of aesthetic pleasure can be found in
the constant attempt to move from imagination to understanding without ever arriving there" (H,
31). We attempt to conceptualize the work, but it is beyond all rational efforts to bring it to
full understanding. Pleasure, for Kant, is formal in nature. Kant believes that the felicitous shapes,
the harmony and compatibility of the lines and curves, the play of shadow and light, the ways in
which all the elements are arranged and structured in the work of art produces the spectator's
pleasing aesthetic experience. Kant is emphatic that the experience of art is inconsistent with
cognitivism, and Hammermeister elucidates this below.

Kant makes it perfectly clear that the aesthetic judgment shares precious little common
ground with rational judgment, and that art therefore has not capacity to teach us anything,
beauty has relation to insight and cognition (28).
Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetics radicalizes Kant's philosophy, for Schopenhauer
perceives the aesthetic experience as a perceptive moment of legitimate insight into the reality of
the universal aspects of the world, or knowledge of the Platonic Ideas, as Schopenhauer refers to
them. Whereas Kant focuses primarily on the work of art and the spectator's involvement,
Schopenhauer adopts a tripartite approach, which focuses simultaneously on the artist (as
creative genius), the work of art, and the aesthetic experience of the spectator as she is
enraptured and enlightened in the pleasure of the aesthetic moment. The pleasure of the aesthetic
experience, for Schopenhauer, relates to the cessation of the mechanical (causal) processes of
"willing." As Christopher Janaway reasons, "When all the possibility of suffering is abolished,
the state of pure objectivity of perception becomes one that makes us feel positively happy" (76).
This involves a state of "will-less contemplation," which represents the most objective kind of
knowledge we can have, art "uniquely displays things as they eternally are" (77). Schopenhauer
is providing an early version of cognitivism in art, and, importantly, linking the concerns of art and
the concerns of philosophy. As Julian Young argues, "Good art, is for Schopenhauer, a
cognitively important enterprise. It communicates knowledge to us, knowledge moreover, of a
universal import [. . . ] art tells us about life and not just lives" (135).
As Schopenhauer states in The World as Will and Representation, "Not merely philosophy
but also the fine arts work at bottom towards solving the problems of existence" (234). For
Schopenhauer, both philosophy and art spring from the same primordial human drive to answer
ultimate questions about the world and human life. Both philosophy and art graduate beyond the

realm of subjectivity characterizing the everyday modes of conscious thought. Schopenhauer
relaxes the tension between art and philosophy that Plato establishes in the Republic, and in a
radical move, makes the claim that with respect to "motivation" and "content," philosophy and art
are one and the same endeavor. However, Schopenhauer is clear that "methodologically" they
function in different ways: philosophy presents its answers conceptually and art offers its
solutions perceptually. While this distinction is important in Schopenhauer's work, there is a way
to understand it in terms that are quite consistent with the idea that, even from a methodological
point of view, there is no good reason to retain the idea that art and philosophy are distinct.
Although Schopenhauer surmounts Plato by establishing the epistemological legitimacy of
art, he encounters a problem when rectifying art with philosophy. According to Young, "If one
seeks to refute Plato's denigration of the art by describing it in terms which he reserves for
philosophy one runs the risk of obliterating the distinction between art and philosophy" (140).
Schopenhauer is well aware of the risk and so retains the methodological distinction between art
and philosophy. In the field of comparative literature, we encounter this distinction in the notion
that literature is not philosophy and vice versa. Rather, with respect to philosophy and literature
there seems to exist two distinct types of work: (1) literature that merely suggests a philosophical
theme and (2) philosophical prose which elucidates one or another philosophical position. In the
former instance, philosophy is diluted, in the latter instance, literature (as art) is sacrificed to the
greater cause of philosophy proper. It is possible to grasp this distinction in terms of comparing
Sartre's Nausea to Kafka's "Metamorphosis." Although both speculate on existential dread and
the un-canny mood of alienation, only the former is considered an authentic work of philosophy
as literature. Young believes that there is no good reason why the distinction needs to exist, why
it cannot simply be erased or obliterated. Rather than endorsing the distinction between art and
philosophy, it would be better to "simply accept the obliteration of the distinction, to deny that

there is any absolute distinction between art and philosophy. This, I think, in outline, is what a
modern "Continental" philosopher would say" (151).
Young's statement requires unpacking, for we must be aware of the implications of uniting
literature (art) with philosophy. When referring to the "Continental" philosopher, Young alludes to
a way of doing philosophy that embraces many and varied forms of knowledge, and this includes, in
particular, a form of "aesthetic" knowledge that is irreducible to propositional or calculable
knowledge. For the purpose of this essay, we will concern ourselves with the special
knowledge that art gives us, which is a form of "perceptual understanding," or aisthesis.
According to the ancient Greeks, this form of truth, or mode of truth-revealing (aletheieun),
provided knowledge of the aestheta, or sensory, perceptible objects. In the philosophy of
Nussbaum, we relate this way of knowing to what she terms, "rational emotion," the type of
emotional and perceptual insight which manifests the truth of literature, film, and the fine arts. In
the philosophy of David Best, this understanding is described as "direct intuition," not in terms
of a hunch, or gut feeling, that is opposed to reason or reasoning, but in terms of the immediate
apprehension of some thing by means of perception and reason, which establishes a legitimate
relationship between mind and some object. Philosopher Michael Gelvin talks of a similar form of
knowledge that arises from authentic philosophical inquiry, which stands in contrast to the type
of truth we acquire by means of a formal investigation. This poetic-philosophical knowledge,
arising specifically from inquiry, is not limited to formal, calculable truth, for it stands "outside of
the calculative enterprises of classificatory science and logical inference" (9). As will be shown,
this form of knowledge, which is part and parcel of our experience of art, is a legitimate,
autonomous form of knowledge that is not in any way at a remove from the processes of rational
thought.

In line with Schopenhauer's philosophy, Classicist H. D. F. Kitto makes the argument
that Sophoclean drama is philosophical in nature because Sophocles is, quite simply, doing
philosophy imaginatively and creatively through the medium of drama. Sophoclean drama,
according to Kitto, is both philosophical and artistic, because Sophocles engages in the process of
inquiring into the nature of things, and by means of abstraction, is philosophically divining
knowledge of universals from particulars and communicating this insight to the spectators of
the drama. Below Kitto compares the tragedians, specifically with reference to Sophocles, with
the Pre-Platonic philosophers.
[I]n general the Greek tragic poets persuade us of this; that they have contemplated the
human scene with all the sympathetic [emotional-cognition] awareness of which the
creative artist is capable; that as philosophical thinkers they have thought their way
through this and have reached some underlying and unifying principle - much like Thales,
Anaximander and the rest did with the physical universe; and that finally, as artists again,
they have recreated this underlying [universal] truth entirely in terms of [particular]
human action and suffering; so that the play becomes not a slice taken from life, but
something more of a vertical section of life., so taken as to reveal something of its
foundations (63-64).
Thus, we understand that the movement from philosophy to art and back again is not two separate
activities, but a duplicitous expression of a single activity, which unifies philosophy with art.
Sophocles' philosophical enquiry inspires knowledge which is communicated through the art of
tragic poetry. When considering Plato's denigration of art in light of the markedly different and
superior role philosophy should play in the life of the state, we must be aware that the segregation
of philosophy from art arise out of Plato's academic understanding of philosophy as embodied in

his school, the Academy. However, if we attend to Kitto's comparison of the tragedians to the PrePlatonic thinkers, we note the great similarity between philosophy and the tragedian's art, we see
that their methods and philosophical foci are similar, e.g., the poetic, imaginative approaches to
solving problems across a broad spectrum, and thinkers, or poetic philosophers, such as
Empedocles immediately leap to mind.
Aristotle's famous words that begin the Metaphysics, "All humans desire to know,"
express our innate drive toward the condition of knowledge in the attempt to explain things that
hold us in their sublime spell. Existential philosopher Karl Jaspers reiterates this understanding of
the human in Way to Wisdom when making the claim that we are all philosophical as a general
condition of our humanity. He describes philosophy in terms of its perennial nature, tracing its
primordial origins to our predisposition to "wonder" at and about our existence. As Jaspers
writes, "There is no escape from philosophy," nor is there escaping the fact that we all are, in
varying degrees, philosophers. Jaspers makes the case for understanding this drive to do
philosophy by examining the thoughts and musings of children: "It is not uncommon," he writes,
"to hear from the mouths of children words which penetrate to the depths of philosophy" (J, 10). In
Jasper's view, everyone is capable of philosophical judgment and can engage in the meditative
process in his or her own way, and, importantly, according to Jaspers, with no formal or academic
training. "Our own humanity," he writes," our own destiny, our won experiences strike us as a
sufficient basis for philosophical opinions" (J, 10)
Phenomenologist Max Scheler echoes Jasper's sentiments when claiming that philosophy
is a spiritual endeavor, which should not be limited to professionals in the academic institutions,
because it constitutes the very core of our humanity. In terms that are reminiscent of Sartre, Scheler
claims that we are condemned to do philosophy, it is a way of life that is thrust upon us by virtue
of our Dasein, our way of being-in-the-world, and, whether conscious of it or not, we are always

engaged in philosophically assessing our existence. We do not inherit philosophy from our
forebears, it is not taught to us. Rather, philosophy represents our primordial inheritance that
presupposes our being human in the first instance. The human confronting its world philosophically
is the stuff of existential literature, a leitmotif in the fictional writings of Sartre, Camus, and
Marcel, wherein we find the attempt to understand and communicate human reality as it manifests
in concrete situations, which reveal the universal human predicament, wherein each particular
situation is pregnant with possibilities that might be lived by any human being. What these
writers communicate philosophically about the human situation in praxis might be said of all
great literary minds. Through the stances that the characters adopt while confronting the
difficult aspects of life that can neither be changed nor overcome, we learn of the ways that our
world is formed through creative, poetic activity, which includes the encounter with meanings
and values transcendent of our subjectivity that contributes to our development. As Everett W.
Knight argues, in Literature Considered as Philosophy, there are many instances of literature
that exist, which is not spoken of “in connection with existentialism, which, nevertheless, is
existentialist in that it is literature as philosophy, " and its authors are philosophers in the same
sense of the existential philosophers mentioned above, and such authors include for Knight, Gide,
Malraux, and Antione de Saint-Exupery (Knight 1966 15).
In addition to the aforementioned existential authors, it is possible to imagine authors and
poets such as Homer, Ovid, Shakespeare, Austin, Proust, Dickens, Kafka, and Hesse doing
philosophy in the manner herein described. In addition, we might also imagine the aforementioned
artists having the traits and characteristics of "genius," which makes their work worthy of our
continued attention and admiration, demonstrating the conscious perfection of their innate ability
to engage us philosophically through their art. Genius consists not only in grasping understanding
the human emotional and intellectual life in terms of the particular, the subjective, i.e., what this

man or woman suffered, what happened in this specific situation at this precise time, but genius
also calls for the intuitive understanding of the universal aspects of life, and, as Robert Wicks
claims, "apprehending the universal calls for the philosopher" (100). The artist as genius is
beholden to the task of transferring and communicating philosophical insight through literature
and poetry, and has the distinct ability to re-produce what is apprehended or experienced
through philosophical inquiry by giving aesthetic form to the insights. According to
Schopenhauer, the genius "retains the presence of mind which is necessary to enable him to repeat
in a voluntary and intentional work what he has learned in this manner; and this repetition is the
work of art" (118).
In light of what has been said regarding art as philosophy, we will now consider the role
of the artist, or author of great literature by locating the origin of the work of art in the
drive to philosophically inquire into the nature of the world and human being, which for
Jaspers, represents the sources from which philosophy springs: "Wonderment," states Jaspers,
"gives rise to question and insight; man's doubt in the knowledge he has attained gives rise to
critical examination and clear certainty; his awe and sense of forsakenness lead him inquire into
himself (J, 17). This sense of "wonderment" is the source, or origin, of philosophy, and we might
also identify this as the source, or origin, of the work of art, if we are convinced by
Schopenhauer's arguments. To reiterate, the notions of particular and universal in philosophical
inquiry stand in direct relation to the existential truth which philosophy seeks to reveal. Jaspers
arguers that all philosophy presupposes that human existence is two-fold in nature, we all
experience two types of "situations": ( 1 ) particular situations that change and present us with a
multiplicity of scenarios and possibilities, i.e., particular contexts that are rooted in human
subjectivity, and (2) universal situations

which remain essentially the same even if there momentary aspect changes and their
shattering force is obscured: I must die, I must suffer, I must struggle, I am subject to
chance, I involve myself in inexorable guilt. We call these fundamental situations of our
existence ultimate situations (20)
These situations of which Jaspers speaks are inescapable realities that cannot be surmounted,
only acknowledged. The great artist author captures both of these types of situations in thought and
imagination, and, by means of artistic creation, communicates imaginatively this existential insight
along to the readers of great novels. As Jaspers describes, between the great artist (author) and the
spectator, in the moment of the aesthetic experience, the spectator assumes the role of participant in
the philosophical discourse between artist and spectator. Great literature initiates the noetic
discourse that is the "communication from understanding to understanding, from mind to mind,
existence to existence," in a loving contest, "which profoundly unites self and self (26).
In light of the foregoing discussion, positive steps have been made toward making the
following claim: All great literature is art by its nature; All art is philosophical by its nature;
Therefore, all great literature is philosophical by its nature. It is possible to understand why Aristotle
praised Oedipus Rex as the most tragic (and philosophical) of plays in terms of what has been said
about art as philosophy, for the play re-produces, by dealing artistically and philosophically with
themes that are now familiar from reading Locke and Hume's inquiries into self-understanding,
or self-identity. The play centers on Oedipus' philosophical inquiry into self-identity, and despite
what appears on the surface, the play is really not an investigation in terms of specifically asking
the question: "Who and what is Oedipus?" with the purpose of producing objective knowledge,
e.g., "through a mere investigation of objects" (80). Learning facts about the character, that he is
the King of Thebes, prone to rash judgments, and tenacious to the point of obsessive, does not

translate into valuable philosophical insight. As previously addressed, there is an important
philosophical distinction between inquiry and investigation, the latter is concerned with what a
person is, the former is concerned, more correctly, with what it means to be a person. According to
Gelvin, the advantages of conducting an inquiry into self-identity as opposed to an investigation,
is that the former provides us "with the ability to talk about modes of existence without [specific
and restrictive] reference to a particular subject and without objectifying or substantizing what
is talked about” (81). Thus, the "self is neither a mere logical subject nor an object, and so
holds the potential to provide a fundamental source of ontological, or universal, significance.
The existential inquiry into self-knowledge that Oedipus undertakes, and we, the reader or
spectator, undertake with him, is at once the understanding and acknowledgment of the uniqueness
of his quest as the King of Thebes along with the understanding of the tragic implications that the
quest of Oedipus has for our lives, for all lives. The inspiration or "tragic knowledge" we glean
from Oedipus Rex is perhaps best summarized by Nietzsche, who acknowledges that selfknowledge often comes at the expense of self-annihilation. Oedipus suffers a general truth about
human consciousness and the following warning serves all those who might, like Oedipus, dare
to push philosophical self-inquiry beyond the bounds that might be termed "natural":
[W]oe to the fatal curiosity which might one day have the power to peer out and down
through a crack in the chamber of consciousness and then suspect that man is sustained in
the indifference of his ignorance by that which is pitiless, greedy, and murderous (80).

On Literature's Potential as Ethical Philosophy
Aristotle, in Poetics makes a powerful case for art as philosophical enquiry into the ethical. We
might imagine tragic drama posing the following ethical question, "What is it to be a 'good'

human being?" According to Dennis Schmidt, Aristotle, in analyzing the monumental effect of
tragedy demonstrates that the "task of thinking this experience could not be understood except as
a task that belonged to the ethical life of the human being" (Schmidt, 47). However, this is not to
indicate that tragedy is morally didactic in its approach and purpose. Rather, it is heuristic in
nature, an art form that encourages discovery and understanding by means of living through the
experience of the tragedy, which is a mimetic and philosophical re-presentation of the human
condition, expressing all of its triumphs, follies, and, above all, its tragic moments of profuse
and intense suffering. As Schmidt argues, "The play space of imitation is a realm in which
possibilities are explored (just as a child might play at being a doctor or philosopher), and it is a
realm in which our instinct to enlarge our world is unfolded" (50). Tragedy, as opposed to being
an expression of truths that have already been worked out in advance by the artist, is a
philosophical expression of those aspects of life that retain their question-worthy status. Tragedy
is concerned with the realm of praxis, specifically with those aspects of being that can always be
otherwise or indeterminate, those things beyond the complete control of autonomous rational
choice, those things subject to chance and tuche, or luck. The "moral seriousness" of the tragic
play hinges on the fact that chance and luck play pivotal roles in human affairs, affecting, in
certain circumstances, a tragic set of consequences in the lives of the characters.
For Aristotle, the ethical life is always life-in-praxis (in activity), a life in transition, wherein
the circumstances and situations within which we find ourselves as moral agents are always
changing. There exists an indeterminacy with respect to legitimate ethical comportment that
eludes all attempts at predictability. For this reason, Nussbaum makes the following point,
"Moral theory cannot be a form of scientific knowledge that orders the 'matter of the practical' into
an elegant antecedent (deductive) system" (Nussbaum 1990 141). For example, Nicomachean
Ethics is at most a "sketch" or "outline" of the ethical life, "whose content must be given by

experience, and whose central claims can be clarified only by an appeal to life and works of
literature" (141). Literature functions as an imitation of life in narrative form to engage,
challenge, and affect change in the reader's ethical disposition (hexis), and it is crucial to our
inquiry into the ethical because it
does not simply (as does history) recount that this or that event happened; it searches for
pretense of possibility - of choice, of circumstance, and the interaction between choice
and circumstance -that turn up in human lives with such a persistence that they must be
regarded as our possibilities (171).
In Francis Fergusson's introduction to Aristotle's Poetics, it is stated that the artist imitates
human actions ( i n praxis) by means of capturing the movement of the various manifestations of
the human spirit. "Praxis" is motivated, goal-oriented, yet highly unpredictable action, which is
the movement of the human being to its ends, whether successful or unsuccessful. Through verse
and action (imitation), the play uses metaphor to re-produce the harmony and rhythm of the
human life in an artistic form. In tragedy, pathos affects the soul (psyche), inspiring the
characters' actions, their passions and actions are inextricably linked, just as they are in the real
world of which tragedy is the imitation. We must be clear when employing the term "passion," or
"emotion," and the latter will be the preferred term (more will be said on this subject below), for
it is incorrect to link the emotions with blind, immediate sensations such as pain, hunger, or thirst.
The emotions are never devoid of cognitive function, e.g., pity and fear both have objects and
require a rational comprehension of what is involved in terms of each emotion. Actions motivated
by fear and pity are actions that have purpose and are directed by our understanding of these
emotions.

Fergusson makes this crucial point about the relationship between actions and the emotions
in the following manner: "The two concepts [praxis and pathos], abstractly considered are
opposites; but in our human experience action and passion are always combined, and in fact they
are recognized in Aristotle's psychology" (11). What Aristotle is most concerned with is "pathetic
motivation" in the form of'" ethical motivation,' which lies in close proximity to reason and the
consciously controlled will," or the way in which the soul's moral faculties, honed through
habituated activity, allow for the proper discharge of the passions or emotions in the right amount
in the right context toward the right individual, and, this for Aristotle represents "virtuous"
interpersonal activity. According to Aristotle, we learn to be moral through habituated training of
the (moral) faculties through both practical and aesthetic activity (such as the experience of
tragedy in the kathartic effect). Katharsis, depends for its actualization on the mimetic processes
enacted in the narrative, and through the effect of mimesis there is an identification, but always at a
distance, with those who undergo suffering. Katharsis is a highly charged emotional event in
which intuitive knowledge concerning the foundations of life is revealed. As Schmidt reasons, in
the moment of Katharsis a revelation occurs and
an insight is obtained about the aims of life. One learns to see without, like Oedipus,
needing to go blind. The supreme kathartic moment comes when one sees oneself in the
empty sockets where once Oedipus had eyes. When the void becomes the mirror
wherein one sees one's own soul reflected, one experiences what Aristotle calls,
"katharsis" (152).
Philosopher Nickolas Pappas points out that katharsis is usually thought to denote a medical
purgation of the emotions to allow one to rid oneself of the poison, so to speak, "like a laxative
or enema that cleaned out the digestive system" (17). Tragedy is usually thought to endorse the

flushing out of the passions, facilitating a return to a neutral and calmed state. However, as
Pappas suggests, "Aristotle does not take emotions to come in quantities that either get released
or remain suppressed. On his view, the expression of an emotion helps to strengthen that
emotion thus people who regularly vent their anger become more irascible, not less" (18). In
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle does not endorse the purgation of emotions, but rather their
consistent and well-regulated expression or discharge. Tragedy allows for the spectators to
experience and endure an emotional encounter of a special type, and, "if their moral arousal leads
to Katharsis (plus delight over the passions' excitement), and this arousal brings ethical
habituation, then Katharsis just is training and habituation" (18). On this view, Katharsis is a
clarification of the emotions and a calibration of the emotions to fit the everyday ways we
encounter the world in practical (moral) activity. We gain insight from the tragedy (art) about
how we should regulate and direct the manifestation of the emotions of fear and pity in moments
of authentic moral comportment.
That understanding forms part of the groundwork for ethical behavior, since Aristotle's
ethics connects ethical behavior to well-trained emotions. Thus the clarification
view helps harmonize Aristotle's aesthetics with his ethics [ . . . ] Aristotle presumes us
able to reason about our emotions, and make them more reasonable (18).
For the Greeks, artistic concerns were wedded with moral philosophy, and this, claims
Nussbaum is what modern philosophy has, to its detriment, forgotten, or worse, consciously
ignored. Against traditional forms of moral philosophy, e.g., deductive treatises which are always at
a rational remove from our lived-experiences wherein we encounter the emotions, the type of moral
philosophy we encounter in Kant (The Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals), Nussbaum is
suggesting a return to a Neo-Aristotelian form of ethical speculation, which includes, and in fact

necessitates, the melting of ethical concerns, aesthetics, and the return of the emotions from their
maligned status as irrational drives into the rational processes of the philosophical enquiry into the
"good" life. Traditional academic instruction in ethics includes the analysis of the ethical systems
of the philosophers, as "ethical theory" in the form of moral analysis, a "systematic endeavor to
understand moral concepts and justify moral principles and theories" (Pojman 2006 396).
Ethical instruction also includes the incorporation of moral prompts, or "case studies," which
are employed to inspire speculation and discourse, all of which work toward the end of gaining a
proper understanding of the ethical life. Ironically, as Nussbaum points out, these traditional
ways of studying ethics tend to incorporate a detached form of philosophical contemplation, and
this is representative of the inauthentic drive to capture in pure thought, the so-called "objective
state-of-affairs," moral or otherwise, while transcending human subjectivity. According to
Nussbaum, this form of detached thinking, which is at a "godlike" remove from concrete realities
of our emotional interpersonal relationships, detaches itself from the immediate lived-context of
our life and from the sentient, visceral, and immediate nature of our practical affairs, thus
precluding the understanding of the intimate, legitimate connection between authentic
philosophical thought and the emotional life.
We encounter this detached attitude toward the emotions and the world of appearances in
Plato, but it is important to note that even in Plato there is not a rejection of the emotions because
they are devoid of cognitive content. Rather, Plato rejects the emotions because they inspire an
inferior form of reasoning, a form of "perceptual" reasoning that is at odds with the functioning of
theoria. Theoria does not simply refer to the speculative or contemplative life, it refers to a form
of contemplation that seeks to detach itself from, and purge the philosopher of, worldly ties in
order to ascend to the "pure" understanding of the Forms (eidai). In the Phaedo, this is the ideal
form of contemplation that the philosopher must practice in preparation for death. According to

Plato, as expressed through Socrates, one who comes closest to absolute knowledge, does this most
perfectly when approaching the object with thought alone,
without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense perception
with his reasoning; but who, using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality
pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears, and in a word,
from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to
acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it (14).
This includes for Plato the way one acquires true knowledge of the intellectual and moral virtues.
For Plato, the emotions are associated with the world of appearances, they are neither eternal nor
trustworthy and are referred to by Plato as non-existence, or me on ("non-being"). Nussbaum
argues that this detached form of philosophical thought (theoria), which Plato finds most
effective for doing philosophy causes us to lose sight of the historical particulars of our existence
within which we are firmly rooted, and this historical, temporal, particular, and practical existence
is linked to the life of the emotions, and these emotions, as already stated, are not opposed to
reason, but are the result of human understanding. For Nussbaum, literature is the most useful
philosophical medium through which to trace out the richness and diversity of the emotional life
of the human being, which represents the inquiry into the proper moral life. Her claim is that due
to the complexity of the narrative structure and content of great novels, they are more productive
for elucidating and initiating legitimate moral thinking than the schematic narratives or deductive
reasoning common to traditional forms of ethical philosophy.
Nussbaum suggests that the novel's formal aspects, characterization, temporal movement,
narrative structure, re-presentation through imitation, facilitate an intimate relationship between
the reader and work. By enlisting the reader as a participant, and this occurs through the aesthetic

experience that will be detailed below. The novel is a far-reaching expression of human possibility
and potential, and, as Nussbaum argues, through the characters' triumphs and failures we
experience the fragility of human life, open as it is to chance, the anxiety that accompanies the
human being as it moves through time, and the wide and varying emotional states that are part and
parcel of the complete human life. In Poetic Justice Nussbaum locates the experience of
emotional enlightenment, which broadens and deepens our ethical capacity, in the
experiences we have when we read and thus participate in the great works of fiction.
Literature is in league with the emotions. Readers of novels, spectators of dramas, find
themselves led by these works to fear, grief, to pity, to anger, to joy and delight, even to
passionate love. Emotions are just not l i k e responses to the content of many literary
works; they are built into their very structure, as ways in which the literary form solicits
attention [...] Forming bonds of both sympathy and identification, they cause the reader
or spectator to experience pity and fear in the hero's plight, fear too for themselves,
insofar as their own possibilities are seen as similar to those of the hero (Nussbaum 1996
53).
The "practical insight" we gain from literature promotes the cultivation of the reader's "emotional
openness and responsiveness in approaching new situations. Frequently, it will be her passional
response, rather than detached thinking, that will guide her to the appropriate (ethical-moral)
recognitions." (53). Literature allows not only for the imagination of circumstances that are
similar to our own, but also allows us to imagine how such circumstances, if different, might
effect us or those we love. What is most important about literature is its focus on the human being
as locus of the concern for the morally "good" existence. Great literature manifests transhistorical elements that speak across the generations, transcending the boundaries of cultural.

"Literature speaks to the reader as a human being," Nussbum writes in Love's Knowledge, "not
simply as a member of some local culture, and works of literature frequently cross cultural
boundaries far more easily than works of religion or [traditional] philosophy" (Nussbaum 1990
391).
For example, it is possible to note that literature crosses cultural and historical
boundaries by reading Sophocles' tragic drama, Ajax as a work of inspiring an analysis of the
ethical notions of compassion and forgiveness. Ajax is probably one of the most misunderstood
dramas by Sophocles, usually it is read as a study in hubris and nemesis, reckless arrogance in the
face of the gods which is tempered with divine retribution. This reading skirts the most important
scene in the play, namely, the dispute concerning the burial of Ajax. I have argued in the essay,
“Reading Ajax: A Tutorial in Compassion and Forgiveness” that the burial dispute is the axis upon
which the entire play rotates. Following the suicide of Ajax, the play centers on the plight of
Teucer, the half-brother of Ajax, and it becomes imperative, even at the risk of death, that he be
permitted to honor Ajax with a funeral and burial befitting a valiant and courageous warrior. To
deny burial, to leave a body exposed for the birds and dogs would not only pollute and defile the
corpse, it would also offend the Olympians who would deny the person safe passage to the
underworld. Menelaus, the brother of Agamemnon, stands over the corpse of Ajax,
unwaveringly opposing Teucer, because Ajax had sinned against the Greek rulers, showing utter
contempt for the kings. Menelaus intends to deny burial and preclude Ajax's safe passage to Hades.
Instead of embroiling the situation between the kings and Teucer, as the chorus expects,
Odysseus enters as the proverbial deus ex machina, in the form of the wise enlightened
mediator bearing good judgment and temperance (sophrosune). It is in the particular adversity and
misery of Ajax, driven mad by Athene and now denied burial by the Greek kings, that Odysseus
envisions his own potential, his own possibilities, and beyond this, he experiences the potential

and possibilities of all humanity as they move through history. In the process of establishing an
interpersonal solidarity with Ajax, Odysseus simultaneously affirms the trans-personal
dimension of existence, "I too," he declares, contemplating his own inevitable death, suffering,
and need for burial, "shall come to this need" (55). Odysseus, during the confrontation with the
kings, validates the democratic objective of compromise, which comes in this instance by way
of compassionate forgiveness. He steadfastly denounces hatred, violence, and the aristocratic
and archaic ethos as reasonable solutions to this predicament. The universality of his thought
strikes a dissonant, unmistakable chord with the reader: Morality resides at the heart of human
anguish and two of our most cherished possessions are compassion and forgiveness. To provide
comfort to the ailing, to act in some small way as a palliative against the inevitable conditions of
pain and suffering is a necessity. Odysseus knows that to flout such an ethical truism is to risk
disaster.
Refusing to allow the insanity of an isolated instance tarnish a lifetime of heroic
accomplishments, Odysseus authenticates the quality to look beyond past transgressions and
compassionately pleads the case of his once mortal foe Ajax. In doing so he sways the recalcitrant
Agamemnon to allow burial. It is as if Odysseus validates the following understanding of things:
"To err is human, but to forgive is humane." This is precisely what Odysseus means when
mounting his monumental and eloquent defense (apologia) for the case of Ajax: "Listen then. For
the love of the gods, do not take heart to cast this man forth unburied so ruthlessly. Never let
violence prevail with you to hate so utterly that you should trample justice underfoot" (59).

On Cognitivism in Literature and The Rationality of Our Emotions
In line with what has been said about the aesthetic experience in Schopenhauer's philosophy, we
are now prepared to explicate this experience, which is part and parcel of our cognitive-emotional

involvement with literature. It is a state of heightened awareness of a new and unique perception
of our world. In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman writes of the cognitive nature of art,
which in addition to heightening our emotional sensitivity to the features of the work of art,
grants us access to significant features of the world that it presents to us in new ways. According
to Goodman, art enhances our understanding of both world and self and has a legitimate and
unique epistemological function, as related to art's philosophical essence, artistic representations
are "effective, illuminating, subtle, intriguing, to the extent that the artist or writer grasps fresh,
significant relationships and devises means for making them manifest" (32). Author Terry Barrett
expresses a kindred notion to that of Goodman in claiming that art opens us to experiences that
would otherwise be inaccessible. According to Barrett, art presents alternate ways in which to
understand the world and our place in it, ways of understanding that defy traditional modes of
knowing. In Barrett's philosophy, art simultaneously serves an epistemological and axiological
function, for art is concerned with knowledge as related to normative realm of value and value
judgments. As Barrett claims, art's moral function holds the potential to
unite individuals to others, can make differences of belief more understandable than
strange, and can perhaps help us to look at differences sympathetically rather than
attempting to extinguish them as threatening (101).
What is called "practical insight" by Aristotle (a necessity for good moral deliberation),
manifests the intersection of aisthesis and nous, or functioning of the mind, specifically as nous
pathetikos (the aspect of mind that apprehends what is given in practical contexts through
perception, emotion, and imagination). This relates to what has been said about knowledge as
aisthesis (perceptual knowledge) in the experience of the work of art. As argued by philosopher
Walter Brogen, the perceptions we receive through art are not simply fanciful, pleasurable

perceptions, but rather an aesthetic experience reveals a form of perception as knowledge.
Aisthesis, as Brogen states, "is a way of revealing truth."(78). Louis Arnaud Reid also describes
the aesthetic experience of art in terms of a knowledge experience. Reid, much like the ancient
Greeks, refers to the knowledge of aesthetics (aisthesis) as a form of "direct intuition," or
"direct knowledge through acquaintance and experience" (14). Reid claims that the artistic
experience that facilitates our direct intuition of things includes the knowledge of intrinsic
values, for art presents to the mind, senses, feeling and imagination, "a new fresh, untranslatable
insight into value" (18). According to Reid, in and through the work of art, our experiential
knowledge of values occurs in the form of "immediate insights," which are "conative and
affective as well as cognitive" (18). Reid argues for an expanded concept of knowledge that
includes many ways of understanding the world, in terms of an ensemble of various and sundry
forms of knowledge, with the inclusion of aisthesis as a legitimate, autonomous form of
knowledge. He is working against the modern predisposition and prejudice, wherein scientific
knowledge is pitted against, and deemed superior to, all other ways of knowing, with the
perceptual forms of knowledge losing sorely the epistemological battle for legitimacy.
To reiterate, art does not provide us with knowledge that is conceptual, nor does it provide us
with knowledge that is objective and categorical in nature, providing definitive solutions to the
problems that we encounter through the work. When a fact is known, it is over and done with, but
the truth of art is different and unique, it is a "complex embodiment of value meaning, art is known
in a holistic experience and has to be lived through" (18). Literature requires that the reader
become an active participant in the "cognitive and emotional" process of enlightenment,
demanding the reader's interpretive engagement, and if we return briefly to Schopenhauer, who
elucidates the difference between "conceptual" and "perceptual" forms of knowledge, we
understand the way that art functions when imparting its unique form of knowledge. Comparing

scientific and aesthetic knowledge, we find that the former is actual, explicit, definable, and
conclusive (it comes to an end), while the latter opens us to a unique form of knowledge that is
potential, implicit, undefinable, and inexhaustible. Art calls for the spectator's active
involvement with and contribution to the knowledge process, drawing from her own cognitive
and experiential reserves, while simultaneously allowing the work to communicate its own unique
truth. It is also the type of noetic experience, due to its richness, diversity, and depth, that
continually beckons our return to the work with our curiosity and concern renewed. We find,
more often than not, if the work is truly great, and one thinks of Dosteovsky's The Brothers
Karamozov, that much like the brand of philosophizing found in Heidegger, poses more
questions than it can ever hope to answer. Thus, rather than solutions to the problems that
spawn the inquiry the reader encounters additional problems of a compound nature,
experiences partial solutions, in short, runs up against aporias, which inspire her continued
attention and enquiry. It is possible to link this knowledge as described to the form of enquiry from
out of which it arises, for as was stated earlier, the line of questioning that philosophy as art
undertakes and embodies is linked to inquiry as opposed to what might be termed investigation, this
point is clearly articulated by Gelvin in the following manner:
We distinguish, then, between an investigation in which a question is terminated by an
answer, which results in "knowing;" and an inquiry, in which the problem is not terminated
but enriched or deepened by a process called understanding. In terms of this distinction, an
investigation seeks an answer which terminates an enterprise; an inquiry seeks to deepen the
understanding of a problem and thereby furthers rather than terminates the enterprise (6).
We encounter this notion in Dostoevsky, wherein it is clear that the central problem of the novel is
never resolved, that of the supreme ethical issue of reconciling God's theistic, all-moral nature with

the existence of profuse instances of human suffering, or the suffering of innocents (theodicy). The
novel, through narrative and characterization, expresses to the engaged reader the problem raging
at the heart of religious debate in a more powerful and vivid manner than we find in any nonnarrative philosophical treatise on the subject of theodicy. Ivan, confronting his pious, Christian
brother Alyosha, expresses what has become a universal concern, a seemingly unresolvable
problem, along with a direct challenge to those embracing a Christian world-view when reiterating
the instance of the ruthless murder of a little child by a merciless general, who sets loose his
hounds to tear the boy to pieces before the boy's horrified mother. Ivan truly wants to understand
the "eternal harmony," which would rectify God's nature as that of a supreme moral and
omnipotent being, with the murder, torture, and the suffering of innocents, when he states, "I want
to see with my own eyes the hind lie down with the lion and the victim rise up and embrace his
murderer. I want to be there when everyone suddenly understands what it has all been for" (198).
However, in the end, both brothers are left in a morose state of uncertainty, as the notion of divine,
"eternal harmony" ultimately lies beyond human comprehension, manifesting the critical question
of whether or not faith is a legitimate response to the issue. In this instance, the problem has not
been resolved, it has been compounded, for a crisis of faith occurs, and this leads to the reader
taking up this issue in a continued and sustained discourse that is at once grounded in the text, but
importantly, holds the potential to transcend Dostoevsky, touching the real lives of the readers,
inspiring philosophical and theological contemplation of a legitimately fecund nature.
Returning to the philosophy of Best, who clearly elucidates the revelatory experience of
art, demonstrates that the knowledge art imparts by way of the emotions need not be a nebulous or
abstract concept. Against those who would argue that the emotions are devoid of reason, or
cognition, Best argues convincingly for a link between the emotions and reason, a process which
emerges from our encounter with literature, which Best refers to as, "emotional rationality." Best

attacks the subjectivist view of the emotions, which is based on the assumption that the creation
and appreciation of art, "is a matter of subjective feeling, in the sense of a 'direct' feeling,
'untainted' by cognition, understanding, rationality" (70). A subjectivist views the emotions as
irrational, "blind forces that have nothing (or nothing much) to do with reasoning" (56). According
to this position, art simply cannot be a "cognitive" endeavor, for it has no knowledge to impart or
inspire; thus, art consists in "expressing and receiving experiences, rather than progressively
developing understanding" (73-74). This view fails to acknowledge the logical connection between
the emotions and their objects, insinuating that when we have emotional feelings, no cognition or
understanding is necessary. Against this position, Best argues that our emotions are always objectdirected, dependent on their object, arising only because we understand the object in certain ways.
For example, if one is afraid of X, there is a reason that involves the cognition and
understanding of X, that one fears it. "There is a logical relation," writes Best, "between my feeling
and my understanding or cognition of the object. I am likely to be afraid if I believe it to be a
snake, but not if I believe it to be a rope" (75). Pain, hunger, thirst, and the like, are base sensations
that do not involve or rely on cognition. However, emotions like fear, pity, love, and hate do rely on
cognition, and in terms of these types of "higher emotions," they are determined by, dependent on,
and inseparable from the processes of cognition. In literature, when our sympathies are engaged in
the imaginative interaction with lives and situations different from our own, a two-way movement
occurs at the heart of authentic readership: On the one hand, the characters emotional responses
hinge on their comprehension or understanding of the circumstances within which they are
involved. On the other hand, the reader's emotional states are formed and change as the
understanding of these fictional situations unfold and develop. Best's point is that a change in our
understanding is related to a change in our interpretation and evaluation of the person or situation
and the corresponding emotions we experience. For example, consider the relationships of the

characters and situations in Jane Austin's Pride and Prejudice. Our emotional understanding, or
"emotional rationality," determines our ethical stance toward Mr. Darcy, and it changes and
develops in direct relation to the emotional understanding that emerges as we experience Lizzy's
evolving relationships with such characters as the handsome and deceitful Mr. Wickham.
Importantly, there is the potential in the experience of readership to reflect and reassess our initial
judgments in light of the new experiential evidence. At the conclusion of the novel, we learn that
along with Lizzy, our initial judgment and condemnation of Mr. Darcy were far too hasty. So, our
initial moral sentiments were inspired by an unfair and inaccurate reading of his true moral
character and ethical worth.
Also emerging from Best's critique of subjectivism is the tendency to oversimplify the
conception of human reason, for subjectivism holds the limited view that "reasoning is limited to
the kinds of deductive and inductive reasons which are commonly used in mathematics, symbol
logic, and the sciences" (76). This view overlooks a form of reason termed "interpretive reasoning"
by Best, which is a form of reasoning crucial to all forms of knowledge including mathematics, the
sciences, philosophy, and art. When employing interpretive reasoning, "we are attempting to show
a situation in a different light, and this may involve not only a different interpretation or
conception, but also a different evaluation" (77). As Best argues, interpretive reasoning, as related
to the aesthetic experience, which involves emotions and the imagination, holds the potential to
manifest creative ways in which to approach our moral concepts, engaging art provides us a
legitimate context within which we attempt to "support our conflicting opinions of social, moral,
and political issues" (78). Just because this form of knowledge does not lead to categorical certainty
or guarantee a consensus of opinion, it is not "ineffective," for as Best reasons, encountering views
which differ from our own encourages a tolerance for difference or "otherness," and, as related to
our moral interpersonal relations, it allows for "seeing a situation in a different perspective may lead

to change our opinions" (78). In terms reminiscent of best, philosopher Bertrand Russell describes
the form of knowledge toward which authentic philosophical inquiry aims, which is really a form
of understanding that changes and develops through a loving and charitable interaction between
the philosopher and the objects of her contemplation. For Russell, the ideal mode of philosophical
inquiry is always predicated on moral considerations, based on the sentiments inspiring a loving
and just understanding of the world and its inhabitants. Philosophy, according to Russell, if it is
authentic, can never procure definitive knowledge of the world, and we might protract this
understanding to include the type of knowledge associated with value inquiry, or ethics (as
axiological inquiry), for unlike the veracity that can be established for our analytic or synthetic
claims, value judgments assume their validity only by means of careful and informed discourse,
wherein we compare and contrast various theories for ethical behavior and judging whether or not
they conform with our basic intuitions about what is right and what is wrong.
On The Legitimacy and Justification of Literature as Artistic Medium for Moral Discourse
as Ethical Theory
We began by speculating on literature's role in inspiring legitimate ethical discourse through
reader involvement with imaginative and emotionally relevant fictional characters and situations of
the author's creation. It was stated that philosophy traditionally retains a distinction between
literature (as art) and philosophy proper, which leads to the skeptical view of the effectiveness and
legitimacy of bringing literature and the study of the emotions into the realm of ethical philosophy
(axiology). Traditional moral philosophy is primarily concerned with speculating on general moral
principles and the "logical" application thereof to "real" situations, and this belief that rational
principles can be gleaned a priori and then applied with predictable results to the realm of
practical comportment originates from a disingenuous understanding of the theoria and praxis

relationship based on the scientific and empirical model. Traditional moral philosophy is concerned
with the success of a theory's ability to predict with accuracy the outcome of situations to which it is
applied in practice. This approach, as stated, tends to favor an abstract, detached form of
contemplation that downplays the critical role of the emotions and the "storytelling" imagination in
matters of an ethical nature. For example, as Nussbaum argues, both Kantian ethics (Moral Law
Ethics) and M i l l ' s Utilitarian ethics (Consequentialist Ethics) have traditionally been suspicious of
and hostile to the relationship between "imaginative literature" and the emotions in the realm of
moral philosophy. Put succinctly, the traditional view is that rational moral choices cannot be made
"under the influence of the emotions and the imagination" (Nussbaum 1990 75-76).
For Kant, it is the strict adherence to one's moral duty, which is grasped a priori by
means of practical reason, which is at a remove from experience, from the particular, from the
actual moment and context of actual moral comportment, that determines the "moral worth" of
one's actions. As Nussbaum states, "For Kant, the passions are invariably selfish and aimed at
one's own state of satisfaction." (76). The emotions come into play with respect to means-end
driven activity, and hypothetical imperatives can never have intrinsic moral worth. The emotions
interfere with our strict adherence to the moral law which is always beyond the experiential realm
of our phenomenal interaction with the world. Utilitarianism, which begins in an a posteriori
(empirical) manner, ultimately terminates in the establishment of the abstract principle of utility,
and the "principle of utility," based on a quantitative notion of human "happiness" (a general sense
of pleasure at the privation of pain), is considered rationally applicable in all circumstances for
securing "good" moral ends, ignoring both the motive of the moral agent and the unique particulars
of the immediate situation of action. According to Nussbaum, Utilitarianism, in addition to
claiming that all values are commensurable (e.g., reducing a multiplicity of diverse and unique
emotions to a single emotion, “pleasure”), also downplays the passions because they lead us to

"emphasize personal ties and to rank the nearer above the further, obstructing that fully impartial
attitude toward the world that is the hallmark of Utilitarian rationality" (76). To ask, "What is my
moral duty?" and "How should I maximize utility?" is not the equivalent of asking, "How should I
live an authentically 'good' life?" Nussbaum views this latter question as inspiring an inquiry into
the ethical that is simultaneously empirical and practical: empirical in that "it is based on and
responsible to actual human behavior," and practical, in that "it is conducted by people who are
themselves involved in acting and choosing and who see the inquiry as having a bearing on their
own practical ends" (173). The crux of Nussbaum's argument, is that literature holds the potential
to inspire a more rich, complex form of engagement and involvement in the ethical issues than
traditional, deductive philosophical methods of enquiry, which search for objective universal
principles in the abstract, incorporating sterile, moral prompts or "case studies" in hopes of
inspiring moral discourse.
Schematic philosophers [ethical] examples almost always lack the particularity, the emotive
appeal, the absorbing plottedness, the variety and indeterminacy of good fiction. They lack
too, good fiction's way of making the reader a participant and friend (46).
According to L. C. Knight, because traditional philosophy does not allow the intense and
visceral emotional responses common to the reader of great literature into the philosophical
processes of moral reasoning, it sacrifices the crucial awareness art affords the reader as a
participatory "moral agent." Literature opens the reader simultaneously to the realm of personal
reflection, with the potential for "ethical" development, and, through the encounter with the self
in relation to the Other, the potential to enhance her interpersonal dealings with others, which
manifests the "emotionally toned awareness of the inward, individual experience of others, in its
otherness and uniqueness" (Knight, 1998 63). Knight's philosophy of art stresses "the education of

feeling" in connection with learning from literature about values and morality through an extension
of sympathy between the novel's characters and that the reader. For Knight, literature, as opposed
to a "purposiveness without a purpose," which is to say, against Kantian aesthetics, literature is a
dynamic, creative, and cognitive adventure inspiring an intuitively enhanced apprehension of things,
which extends our sympathies beyond our own "subjectivity" to others and the world we inhabit.
For example, Shakespeare's plays invite us to share the imaginary situations with a close relation to
"real-life," and beyond this, "they invite us to try out different attitudes by entering into them,
provisionally adopting them whilst still keeping a certain distance, and seeing what the result may
be" (63). Undeniably, an ethical world emerges from our reading, a model of the individual and her
relationship to society, to proper and improper ethical modes of interpersonal relationships, which
can be lived through imaginatively and assessed as being either appropriate or inappropriate, moral
or immoral, just or unjust. According to Knight, literature arouses a "warmth and intimacy"
between works and readers wherein our powerful personal emotions work sympathetically in
relation to others, and through experiences which are quite plainly not our own, these emotions
hold the potential to become real and personally meaningful.
Philosopher Eileen John also embraces this position, and expresses it in the following
manner when discussing great works by Jane Austin, Henry James, and Virginia Woolf:
Such works call upon us to take fictional characters seriously as moral agents, to enter
imaginatively into the concrete circumstances of their lives, and to have the kind of
complicated evaluative and felt responses to them that we can have as real people. We often
also imagine things about ourselves in response to art (332).
What I am suggesting in the foregoing analysis is that literature holds the potential to
philosophically inspire our authentic ethical soul-searching, providing a rich environment from out

of which questions and proposed solutions to our moral conundrums emerge. According to
Nussbaum, as related to Knight and John, literature contributes to our authentic ethical practices
in two ways: First, it inspires critical self-reflection, "promoting individual clarification and selfunderstanding," and, secondly, it inspires enlightened communal ethical discourse, "moving
individuals toward communal attunement" (Nussbaum 1990 173). This calls for reader
involvement, and this occurs, as I have suggested, through the "cognitive-emotional" moment of
the aesthetic experience literature inspires, which engages the reader in a participatory role, in a
moment of noetic enlightenment. As John argues, through the process of readership, we perceive
morally relevant elements of the experience, we experience morally sensitive emotional responses
to the work, and we adopt morally challenging perspectives through our imaginative involvement.
Literature provides us with moral exemplars to analyze, criticize, or emulate, and we encounter
through them morally pertinent situations within which we are called to participate in emotional
and imaginative ways. This understanding is in l i n e with what has been stated about Aristotle's
understanding of tragedy, as a philosophical-artistic experience wherein the moral faculties of the
soul are trained to deal virtuously with the emotions. John states that when we participate in works
of great literature, "we learn in the sense of getting training or practice in doing things which are
central to the responsible moral life" (335). Through feeling and imagination, the great works
provide us with the type of perceptually rich experiences required to develop s k i l l s needed for
responsible moral agency, which includes the ability to judge correctly on matters of an ethical
nature.
The fact that we feel certain emotions in certain imagined circumstances helps us know the
moral import of those circumstances (for example when Jane Austin's Emma makes a cruel
remark, we know it is cruel largely because of how it makes us feel and how fervently wish

she had not said it). Hence our experience with a work of art can show us, it seems about
moral import of pertinently similar events, real or imagined (336).
If it is the case that the potential exists for us to learn morally from our involvement with
literature, the following questions must be posed: How is it possible to authentically verify or
validate the experiential knowledge that art provides? How do we know that art's experiential
knowledge is legitimately contributing to our authentic development as responsible moral human
beings? We must examine the validity of the emotions we experience, both their connections to the
characters' moral dispositions and the situations which either befall them or are freely chosen. The
reasoning is obvious, if art leads us to acquire experiential beliefs by means of the emotions, then
the possibility always exists that our beliefs about the emotions we experience might be mistaken.
One such response to this concern is focused on the viable coherence between the emotional
experiences that literature inspires and our actual ways of experiencing, interpreting, and
understanding our lives and the world. In short, it is possible to determine if the emotional
experience afforded by the work of art coheres with the real experiences of such emotions, and, we
are therefore concerned with how these emotions relate to our past experience with an eye to the
future, determining whether these experiences, if they are legitimate, relate to our futural concerns
in authentic ways.
We draw on the emotional, experiential knowledge we have acquired to that point, both in
the sense that we respond according to dispositions we already have, and in the sense that
we interpret our experiences with art, and fiction, in particular, using rich knowledge of the
generating circumstances, causes, effects, and 'feels' or various emotions and experiences
(335)

As John suggests above, we can test our experiential responses for their validity by analyzing our
own lived experiences, the experiences that we as readers bring to the imaginative work, and then,
by rendering a judgment on what is given in the imagination, and either affirm or deny the
response. With time, as John suggests, it is possible to acquire and hone the capability to judge
whether or not we are being played by the author as an emotional pawn, whether or not the author
is manipulating our feelings by merely pushing emotional buttons, or, whether the "experience
has arisen out of a reasonably complex and relevant set of factors" (336). Clearly, it is possible to
have an emotional reaction to the literature, which is not supported by the thematic elements. For
example, when reading a certain story, I might feel an overwhelming sense of loss and sadness
upon encountering a character who in figure and manner is reminiscent of a loved one who has
recently passed away. These are undeniably "real" emotional responses, but with respect to the
story, these emotions are misplaced and would not therefore represent legitimate emotional
responses, for they fail to be authentically supported by the text. To continue in this direction, John
explains what it is like to have a legitimate emotional response to literature. When reading Sylvia
Plath's poem about her infant son, at the same time John had given birth to a boy, the poem elicited
an emotional response that was significant and "powerfully evocative" of how it felt to be a mother.
In this instance, as she writes, the "circumstances and recognitional experience made it reasonable
for me to trust my sense that the poem was experientially revelatory" (335).
The notion of authenticating our emotions applies in a critical manner to morality as it is
considered in this essay, for the understanding of the ethical life does not lie within the purview of
human reason alone, rather, as expressed by Hume, morality is contingent on the ways in which we
feel and perceive, on "sentiments" that inspire and motivate us to make legitimate moral
pronouncements. Literature's ability to inspire intense emotional experiences is inseparable from
its potential as moral philosophy, allowing us to perceive morally relevant elements of experience,

and, in imaginative, creative, and critical ways, allow for the emergence and development of
morally appropriate responses. As stated, the moral analyses of novels is rooted in our imaginative
access to stories in which we encounter fictional characters as moral exemplars, in situations which
define them as free moral agents, all of which inspire critical speculation relevant to our moral
knowledge and the development of our faculties of moral judgment. For example, Nussbaum,
analyzing Dickens' Hard Times (in Poetic Justice), condemns specific aspects of the author's world
view as representing less than adequate moral responses to the situations dealt within the novel,
and, in Love's Knowledge, she affirms Homer's representation of Odysseus for displaying a moral
exemplary attitude. With respect to Hard Times, Nussbaum claims that Dickens fails to adequately
to address the harm bound up with the presentation of class hierarchy, and, in addition, Dickens
also "fails to take note of harms caused to women by inequalities of autonomy that are endemic to
marriage as it was lived in his time" (76). With respect to The Odyssey, Homer is praised for
presenting Odysseus as embodying what it is like to live a life that is fully human, with all of its
uncertainty, fragility, triumphs, and severe limitations. Odysseus opts to leave the island home of
Calypso in the attempt to return to Ithaca, and, "to the readers of the poem from ancient to modern
times, Odysseus' choice does seem intelligent and also admirable" (Nussbaum 1990 366).
Homer's literary project is aimed directly at repudiating, "the choice for divine life, and invests
itself in the choice to explore the various choices particular to the human life, the means of
practical intelligence, love, and virtue that we can expect to find and realize within such a life"
(390).
In light of the discussion thus far regarding the emotions, we must once again turn our
attention to the importance of justification as it relates to the normative realm of values, to issues
relating to ethical/moral speculation, for we require good reasons to believe that the heuristic moral
exercise we are doing when reading is appropriate exercise, that the moral ideals we encounter and

the moral evaluations we render are trustworthy. This is linked to what has thus far been said about
the cognitive value of art, its epistemic weight, for as Johns reasons, when we encounter the
emotional aspects of literature that engender moral sentiments, we at once encounter literature's
goal of "providing rich experiences directly relevant to how we learn from art" (336). With this
understanding, we must concern ourselves with whether or not the work facilitates our learning,
and inspires the type of participation that allows us to perceive things in a morally appropriate
manner, whether or not the situations that inspire our emotions lead to the heightening of our
sensitivity toward the world and others, and, after critical reflection, whether or not our emotions
are inspire viable moral insight, which engenders practical choices leading to good ethical decision
making in the "lived-world." Focused on the qualitative aspects of the moral sentiments that the
work engenders, John responds to this issue by arguing that it is possible to trust the legitimacy of
emotional and moral responses based on the "quality of the imaginative and emotional activity
involved in generating putative moral knowledge" (336). The more rich, vivid, and gripping the
imaginative circumstances are, the more likely they are to be morally relevant to our lived concern.
As John reasons,
[t]he idea is that if we have a vivid, rich, gripping, imaginative response, that is evidence of
a genuine, scrupulous engagement with the imagined circumstances, and evidence that the
imagined circumstances are relevant to real human concerns. We cannot end up working
imaginatively in a such a sustained, compelling way unless there is coherence and
substance to our activity (336).
Admittedly, this so-called criterion for determining the viability of our moral sentiments
derived from our engagement with literature looks to be quite consistent with Descartes' famous
(rationalist) epistemological claim that the veracity of "clear and distinct perceptions" cannot be

denied, but interestingly enough, we find this selfsame notion in the philosophy of Hume, the
skeptic and empiricist, who claims that the clarity, vivacity, and intensity of our "moral" sentiments
(and our attraction or repulsion to said feelings), determines their reliability. Thus, it is possible to
expand on John's claims by incorporating some thoughts from the moral philosophy of Hume.
Interestingly, although staunch about the limited trustworthiness of all empirical knowledge,
Hume was less skeptical in the case of morals, or normative statements (value judgments),
arguing that it is indeed possible to understand and determine moral activity by understanding
our reactions, or attitudes, to the emotions, which ultimately inspire the rendering of moral
judgments. As opposed to reading Hume as an ethicist espousing a "non-cognitive" approach, it
is possible to interpret Hume as arguing for the existence of a special type of understanding with
respect to the emotions. While this is certainly not expressed by Hume in terms of the faculty of
reason, it is nevertheless a form of understanding that accompanies, and indeed determines, the
validity of our moral judgments, which comprises what Hume terms our "moral sense." According
to Hume, human reason does not inspire action, but rather it is the interpretation and understanding
of our emotions that motivate our practical comportment, and we can come to terms with what is
moral or immoral by turning our attention to the emotions we experience. For example, with
respect to vice, Hume states the following: "You can never find it t i l l you turn your reflexion into
your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action"
(Hume 1978 468). The repulsion we experience toward viciousness and malevolence arises from
the sentiment that we detest and are repulsed by the accompanying feelings we experience when we
either witness or imagine inflicting unnecessary, cruel pain upon others, and we thus determine
such behavior immoral. The same is true of virtue, for according to Hume, "To have a sense of
virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a
character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration" (471).

Although Hume disallows the incorporation of analogy into his religious and
epistemological writings, it is ever-present to his moral philosophy. For Hume, it is sympathy that
lies at the root of our personal and interpersonal understanding of morals, which for Hume is the
capacity to internalize and recreate the passions of another in terms of an impression (and idea) of
our own. Sympathy is undoubtedly the central notion of Hume's entire theory of morality as
related to the passions. From the Greek sympatheia, which is literally, "together feeling,"
According to Hume, sympathy is the capacity to experience the emotions of others by having an
idea of their emotions reproduced in us as impressions. The moral sentiments arise when we
ruminate on the situation which produced our impressions. The idea of others’ emotions might be
reproduced in a variety of ways, not least of which is the encounter with literature’s imaginary
fictional worlds and characters. Hume claims that we have a natural propensity to "sympathize
with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different
from, or even contrary to our own." (Hume 489). This explains how qualities of certain feelings,
the "calm passions" for Hume, that give pleasure to one person can inspire pleasure and approval in
others. It is this intimate emotional connection with others that allows Hume to suggest that
although an objective understanding of morality is impossible, at least on the inter-subjective level,
through common feeling, discourse, and agreement it is possible to arrive at a consensus opinion
that might allow us to avoid practical problems about conflicting moral judgments. The analysis of
our sympathetic feelings allows us to move toward a generally shared perspective on the human's
moral disposition, and in this way, Hume's ethical philosophy works to remove the concerns of
morality from the limited, and dangerous, perspective of subjectivism, relativism, or ethical
solipsism.
In addition to feeling with and for others, it is also possible to experience the feelings of
approbation and disapprobation with respect to ourselves, which is to say, we have the capability

of rendering moral judgments about ourselves. There exists for Hume, a "sense of duty" to
examine ourselves in relation to others, e.g., if we compare ourselves to those who are moral
exemplars, such persons as Albert Schweitzer or Mother Theresa, we might find we are sorely
lacking in possessing a virtuous, altruistic disposition, we develop unpleasant feelings or
sentiments about ourselves and become motivated to change the disposition of our character. As
stated, literature provides us with both morally exemplary characters and morally reprehensible
characters in and through imaginative fiction. So, with respect to a moral, virtuous ideal, we might
reflect on Homer's presentation in the Iliad of the final meeting between Hector, Andromache,
and their infant son Astyanax, wherein Andromache pleads with Hector to refrain from returning to
battle, reminding him that Achilles has slain her entire family, and that she depends on Hector to
play the all-encompassing familial role of father, mother, brother, and husband. What is extremely
touching and humane about this scene is that although Hector goes off to defend Troy through his
commitment to social order and great sense of honor, for if Troy falls he knows the horrific fate
that awaits her, she would become a slave to the Archeans. This demonstrates Hector's deep
attachment to Andromache and his marriage, along with the understanding of what must be
sacrificed in order to honor it. Ruminating on these characters in this situation engenders our
concerned thinking on the intimate relationships we share with those we love.
Reid also addresses the issue of justifying our shared moral perspectives in terms that are
now familiar, understood in and through the individual's "education of feeling," which grounds
the potential for an inter-subjective form of ethical agreement regarding normative claims.
According to Reid, when reasoning for moral principles, as opposed to proving them true in the
manner of empirical propositions, the reasons we give are "more like devices for altering emotional
attitudes, either in oneself or in others" (56). Reid suggests that we validate behaviors that we
"ought" to adopt through reasoning, feeling, and conation, and, with the recognition that we ought

to behave in a certain manner arises the concomitant sense of "obligation and potential
commitment" (58). The potential for a more "objective" view of morality is represented in the
"progress from what is an already tentatively accepted personal point of view" (59) From this
personal view, it is possible to graduate beyond one's own subjective perspective and the
limitations thereof through communal discourse, wherein one's personal "commitment with a
provisional content," becomes more "illuminated through communications with other people's
points of view" (59). However, as Reid points out, despite this collective form of agreement, or
justification, "my moral commitment has not become a wholly impersonal thing. 1 was committed
at the start, and I am now recommitted, only I have opened my mind to opinion and wisdom larger
than my own" (59). To engage in legitimate discourse concerning the justification of our moral
claims requires a willingness on the part of everyone involved to be open to new experiences, a
disposition that requires, "virtues of character, and education of feeling, as well as clearness of
intellect" (70). When approaching moral issues, we must be prepared "experimentally to enlarge
[our] experience, either actually or in our imagination" (71). Progress towards a greater objectivity
in the realm of morality entails the type of experience that has been linked with the aesthetic
encounter with great works of literature and art, works that in a unique manner call for
the use of reasoning of different kinds (and is in this sense 'rational,' though always
short of 'proof) but also requires a revision of our commitments and involvements
themselves; this requires qualities of feeling, will, character, as well as intellect (71).
Returning to Hume's philosophy, with respect to what has been said about our personal
involvement with the emotions literature elicits, it must be noted that Hume is careful to point out
that when experiencing the emotions of others in sympathetic states, we must be aware that there is
always a distance present between us and those directly experiencing the emotions, and this

phenomenon of theatrical "distance" was first introduced in the discussion of tragedy when
referencing the philosophy of Schmidt. Although we sympathize with others, we do not experience
their emotions in such ways that they become our own, nor we do not relate them subjectively in
terms of our direct personal needs, wants, and desires. Hume is clear that when experiencing our
moral sentiments that inspire the rendering of moral judgments, we must set aside our private
concerns, “only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular
interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil” (Hume
1978 472). In line with this understanding, a good reader who is judicious will always refrain from
allowing herself to be utterly consumed with the other's passions in such a manner that her
judgment with respect to those passions becomes overwhelmed or severely distorted. We find this
notion in Nussbaum's work as well, wherein she writes of the "judicious spectator," as it is adapted
from the moral writings of Adam Smith (Enquiry into Moral Sentiments). In order to grasp the
practical goal of ethical inquiry through literature, the remainder of the essay will be devoted to
understanding the manner in which the reader’s filtering mechanism unlocks the potential for her
capacity to approach, engage, and interrogate the works of fiction in a critical manner. Elucidating
the formal aspects of this practice is essential if we are to derive ethical insights from the great
works of fiction, which are efficacious in fostering our enlightened and transfigured "self
understanding and communal comportment" (Nussbaum 1990 192).
There is a critical and philosophical way of reading which at once promotes personal
development and inspires legitimate moral debate and discourse, for ultimately we are concerned
with appropriate decision making in concrete moments of moral comportment on a communal
scale. Nussbaum details the type of engaged, critical readership we should employ (judicious
readership), which manifests in the philosophical embodiment of the "judicious spectator."
According to Nussbaum, if we are judicious readers, "we exercise critical judgment in our

selection of novels, and to continue the process of critical judgment as we read, in discourse with
other readers" (Nussbaum 1996 76). Above, it was stated that when encountering the emotions and
feelings that motivate our moral responses, we must be mindful whether or not our responses are
morally trustworthy. In Poetic Justice Nussbaum examines this concern and suggests as informed
critical readers we would do well to attend to the "filtering device" for the emotions that is always
already built into works of fiction due to the formal aspects of literature as an imitative, mimetic art,
that "gives us a kind of guidance that is indispensable to further inquiry - including a critical
enquiry about the literature itself (76). Nussbaum states that this filtering device is related to the
"distance" that the work sets up through the various creative and imaginative machinations
employed by the author, which re-produces our world within the fictitious realm of the novel.
Due to the very nature of literature, with respect to the sympathetic response between fictional
character and reader, there is an emotional intimacy that always occurs at a remove, and this
phenomenon is the hallmark of all great literature.
Schmidt's reading of tragedy, as a possessing a dual-aesthetic nature, wherein the emotional
intimacy experienced by the spectator is marked by a distance, is directly relevant to the way author
crafts (poiesis) the story through the use of "metaphor," i.e., the play is a re-presentation that works
mimetically to transcend what is given on the surface, for, as Schmidt reasons, "Every 'imitation' is
a repetition which involves the recognition of sameness in difference" (51). We feel for and with
the characters and their plights, but this is never a complete identification in which we lose our selfidentity completely. The emotions and passions of Oedipus are not ours - we are not Oedipus. As
Schmnidt argues, mimetic reproduction is unique in that it
escapes the logic of identity governing the operations of reflection. It is more like the selfdiscovery one finds in the eyes of a friend than it is like the self-identification one achieves

by looking in mirror. In mimetic re-presentation the resemblance, the "imitation," which is
produced is simultaneously the communication of differences (55).
In short, as judicious spectators we are not full emotional participants. This is because our
integrated into the fictional context of the novel lacks concrete knowledge of the situation and the
one-to-one identification with the emotions of the characters. Although we feel sympathy with and
for the characters, their emotions are not ours, and this is because we are not literally in the story,
and, according to Nussbaum, it is crucial that we strive consciously to preserve this distance, and
refrain from relating the emotions directly to our own personal interest, our subjective well-being.
We must at once be "passionate for the well-being of others, but not inserting ourselves into the
picture that we responsibly contemplate" (Nussbaum 1996 75). Ultimately, it is suggested by
Nussbaum, that through a judicious form of readership, we come to feel for the (fictional)
characters, which is thus an emotional understanding of them, in a more balanced manner than
they are capable of doing.
Jean-Pierre Vernant, in Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece analyzes the spectator's role
in ancient tragedy and the emerging phenomenon of the "consciousness of fiction." The effect of
tragedy, according to Vernant, is based on the spectators involvement, which depends on the
spectator's apprehension of fiction. Again, as in Schmidt, tragedy is understood in terms of
distance and the creation of "two worlds." The poet, as imitator, is "the creator of a world of
reflections, illusions, pretenses, and fables, all of which constitute the world of fiction," and, as a
doubling of worlds, always stands "alongside the world of reality" (242). Attic tragedy deals with
two worlds: (1) the world of archaic myth, the gods, and the heroes of the past, and (2) the world of
the classical Greeks. The characters were at once present and absent, "portrayed at figures who
cannot possibly be there since they belong to somewhere else, to an invisible beyond" (243).

However, the characters seem to be authentically present because tragedy "adopts the form of real
existence in the immediacy of the performance" (243). For the drama to be successful (e.g., to
elicit katharsis), the spectator's "consciousness of fiction" must be operative, which allows them
to "enter into the game, understanding that what can be seen on the stage belongs not to the place
of reality, but to what must be defined as the place of theatrical illusion. A consciousness of fiction
is essential to the dramatic spectacle; it seems to its condition and its product" (244). Once again, in
Vernant's analysis, we find a unique form of identification with the staged events being described
in terms of distance, a temporal distance, and, just as in Nussbaum and Schmidt, it is due to the
formal elements of the drama that the judicious spectator is able to at once experience and clarify
the emotions. The spectator's well-developed consciousness of fiction allows her to maintain a
position from which to better render an authentic assessment of the emotions (pathe) that arise
from the events that both spectator and tragic protagonist experience in the course of the play.
Beyond what has been outlined above, the judicious reader is also engaging the text as a
philosopher in the sense of understanding the importance of and need for the inclusion of ethical
theory in the experience of readership, where ethical theory is directed to the assessment and
systematic analysis of our emotional experiences with the novel. Ethical theory allows us to
formalize through thought and discourse, "the search for images of life by which we might
possibility live together, and ask what conceptions and images best match the full range of
perceptual connections" (Nussbaum 1990 190). It is never the case that literature provides us with
the moral building blocks from which to construct an "objective" edifice built upon immutable,
eternal, and objective ethical principles for behavior (such as we find in Kant's Moral Law Ethics),
but rather our engagement with fiction functions as the clearing of the ground for a potential ethics
in terms of inter-subjective discourse that arises out of literature and is directed by rigorous
systematic ethical speculation, which contributes,

to our understanding of a literary work by raising questions that this work may or may not
explicitly ask itself concerning the relationship of its ethical views to other issues on which
we have to make up our mind - issues about social structure, about economic distribution,
and about the self and personal identity (191).
Ultimately, as Nussbaum envisages, the process of reading as engaging in philosophical activity,
which culminates in the dialogue between readers from different backgrounds, with unique histories
and outlooks. As stated, the understanding of the emotions we have in relation to literature, and the
moral understanding we acquire regarding the pursuit of good life is never foolproof, known
beyond question, and, like all judgments in the realm of axiology must be rigorously tested for
coherence with other experiences and with our moral and practical theories. As Nussbaum
concludes, this non-deductive process, as a "comparative type of practical reasoning," is always
carried out in cooperation with others, and, in this process, "our intuitions about a literary work
will be refined by the criticisms of ethical theory and of friendly advice, and this may greatly alter
the emotional experience that we are able to have as readers" (Nussbaum 1996 76)
Moral philosophy as "ethical theory" is the systematic endeavor to analyze our critical
justifications for moral theories, allowing us to explore the sources of moral obligation and the
desire to strive toward the ultimate end of "happiness" (eudaimonia), which is embodied in a
flourishing life that is good and virtuous. Ethical theory allows us to work toward establishing
legitimate, reasoned positions based on the understanding of our moral sentiments, which hold the
potential for establishing norms that might guide moral behaviors for individuals and communities.
To remain free from prejudice and dogmatism, we must work to think clearly and confident about
moral problems and values as they legitimately relate to our shared existence, and Nussbaum
insists that solid moral philosophy ensures that a legitimate understanding of the moral positions

with which we are dealing obtains. For example, throughout this paper I have focused on
Nussbaum's philosophy as well as the philosophy of Aristotle, we have endorsed the ethical
position of "virtue-based ethics," which stresses virtuous character development and the
importance of habitual training of the moral faculties, which allow for the proper discharge of the
emotions in concrete practical situations (praxis). The fact that the realm of practical activity is
always changing, we must, through adjustment, continually seek and locate the moral mean
between the two extremes of "virtue" and "vice" in each and every situation within which we find
ourselves. Simultaneously, we must motivated by the proper emotions, which, as stated, are
discharged in a precise manner, in just the right amount, at just the right time, toward the
appropriate individual. Although privilege has been given to this ethical position throughout the
discussion of literature and the ethical life, it would be irresponsible as good philosophers, and this
seems to be Nussbaum's attitude, if we were to simply dismiss out of hand other type of ethical
systems without first giving them a fair and charitable reading by devoting careful attention to the
analysis of their claims. For this reason, Nussbaum stresses that we must approach philosophers
such as Kant by means of a thoroughgoing systematic analysis, and not, "by using them
polemically, as straw men" (Nussbaum 1990191).
It is important to be informed about the ethical position we are considering, especially
when adducing our own position through critical ethical discourse and arguing for counter
interpretations. For example, a detailed, accurate rendering of Kant's ethics, as a deontological,
absolutist, "action-based ethical" system, actually functions to elucidate the position of "virtueethics," as has been presented, by revealing it in the antithetical light of Kant's philosophy. For as
Nussbaum states, "We grasp by contrasting (through informed critique); we sense what
something is by bounding it off against something different" (190). Because Kant relies on the
primacy and efficacy of human reason, the autonomy of the will that is good in-and-of-itself

through gleaning aproiri the supreme Moral Law (The Categorical Imperative), it is possible to
argue that his system fails on three fronts: (1) it fails to inspire the motivation to be moral; (2) it
fails to take into account the spontaneous, unpredictable dimensions of ethics; and, (3) it fails to
address the moral development of the character, or development of the proper moral disposition
(hexis). Stressing a blind sense of duty above the active pursuit of the good, the moral aspirations
arising from the proper understanding of the appropriate emotions are ignored, i.e., the moving,
sentient aspects of human existence are precluded from the discussion about morality. Kant, as
with all action-based practitioners, ignores the many and varied circumstances that the moral agent
encounters. In addition, Kant ignores the spontaneous character of the human's being as a spirit in
transition, relegating the important of human potential for developing the soul morally through
habituated activity to an inconsequential status. Virtue ethics, as opposed to adhering to eternal
and objective principles of duty, fosters opportunities for us to develop moral sensibilities and
abilities through taking on greater and greater moral responsibilities as legitimate, autonomous
contributors to a deeply moral society. The development of our moral character is crucial to ensure
that we habitually act in ways that are morally upstanding. For example, someone with the character
trait of benevolence will be more apt to be a responsible friend, and this disposition frames and
directs her entire life.

Concluding Remarks:
My paper did not present a detailed instructional module for structuring and implementing lesson
plans for teaching ethics through the incorporation of literature; it did not attempt pedagogy. I
did not outline philosophy's proposed solutions to ethical problems as expressed through
fictional themes. Rather, I attempted to elucidate the experience of literature as philosophy,
which ultimately, I believe, substantiates literature's potential for inspiring legitimate

philosophical discourse within the college classroom and beyond. In 1994, Nussbaum taught the
class Law and Literature at the University of Chicago as a visiting professor. Teaching theorists,
practitioners, law students, and future politicians, those in the public life, she first began to
contemplate literature's part, as philosophy's ally, in helping to understand the role of the
emotions in public judgment, and the importance of imaginative literature in the process of
ethical thinking about compassion, mercy, and justice, where literature facilitates the imagining
the situations of others which are different from our own. As she later writes in Love's Knowledge:
"My aim is to establish that certain relevant texts are indispensable to a philosophical enquiry
into the ethical sphere: not by any means of sufficient, but sources of insight without which the
inquiry cannot be complete" (Nussbaum 1990, 23-24)
In this paper, I acknowledged the work of Everett W. Knight, whose study, Literature
Considered As Philosophy, reasons for the same conclusion I have argued: literature is
philosophy in its essence. From Baudelaire to Sartre, Knight analyzes the "engaged" literature of
France, which expresses philosophically the commitment to stay the middle course between
religious absolutism and philosophical-scientific absolutism, for in the age of existential anguish,
forlornness, and despair there are "no longer any absolute ethical or historical positions." In light
of the freedom which is thrust upon us, "our situation in the world becomes the 'point of view' in
relation to which the universe orients itself" (16). Knight's work unfolds as hermeneutic
interpretation, and he is unconcerned with the formal aspects of doing "poetics." In addition,
Knight focuses exclusively on literature philosophizing French, existential themes. For these
reasons, most of my attention was devoted to the work of Martha Nussbaum, who has perhaps
done more at the intersection of literature and philosophy than any other contemporary thinker.
Although it is true that Knight reads implicitly the ethos of existentialism, Nussbaum explicitly
and directly engages ethics in a grand, all-encompassing manner. The fact that she includes to

her analyses many instances of great literature, drawing from a wide variety of historical sources,
from the epic poems of classical Greece to the modern Anglo-American tradition in literature,
makes it imperative that considerable attention is given to her philosophy. It was also imperative,
considering my focus was on the explicating the potential for doing ethical philosophy through
the engagement with literature, or art, to introduce the seminal work of the great educational
philosophers such as David Best, Louis Arnaud Reid, and L. C. Knight. Ultimately, it was my
intention to attempt to understand the most appropriate way to contemplate literature's legitimate
potential in philosophy's classroom.
I have attempted to graduate beyond the foundational relationship that philosophers and
classicists such as Martha Nussbaum, Eileen John, Dennis Schmidt, and H. D. F. Kitto have so
successfully argued between philosophy and literature by adding to the discussion in several ways:
First, rather than viewing literature and philosophy as companions, or allies, in the quest to divine
the ultimate questions concerned with the moral life, I sought to explicitly formalize a notion that
appears to be implicit in the work of other philosophers, namely, to formalize the argument for a
conception of literature as art, which is always already philosophy in its essence, and for this 1
have turned to the monumental contributions of Schopenhauer regarding this issue. My purpose
was twofold in that I attempted to offer a definition of art that included linking the pleasure of art
with its innate ability to reveal knowledge of a unique kind, and, as a result of this claim to art's
"cognitive" potential, graduate beyond the traditional notion of the aesthetic experience we find
in the formalism of Kant. Secondly, by attending to what David Best, L. C. Knight, and Louis
Arnaud had to say about the emotions and their crucial role in understanding "values" as given
through the artistic experience with literature, I sought to explicate to the essence of the aesthetic
experience as a legitimate noetic phenomenon by elucidating the form of knowledge art imparts,

which was linked to an intuitive, emotional understanding of things. Lastly, I have incorporated
aspects of Hume's moral philosophy to supplement the claims of Nussbaum and Johns regarding the
philosophical justification for our moral sentiments and beliefs, both at the personal and
interpersonal level.
In closing, the methodology that I have adopted requires articulation, for teaching
philosophy as art is not the same thing as the critical analysis of art. For example, from the
perspective of formalism, we might very well work to reveal the creative and imaginative
mechanisms structuring the overarching system of aesthetic processes that allow the work of art to
"mean," but this is certainly not appropriate, or enough, shall we say, for the critical philosopher
focused on moral issues in relation to art. We must also be concerned with meaning, which is to
say, as philosophers engaging literature as art, we must be concerned with both the thematic and
formal elements of literature. We find these aspects common to both the field of comparative
literature and Nussbaum's philosophy, i.e., the dual concern with "how" the text means (poetics)
and the concern with "what" the text means (hermeneutics). What is necessary, I believe, for the
effective study of philosophy, moral or otherwise, by way of creative, imaginative medium of
fiction, is a method that addresses both these aforementioned aspects of literary analysis: We
should do "poetics," attempting to work out how our engagement with literature is made
meaningful, how this meaning happens from a formal perspective. We should also engage the
texts by means of hermeneutic interpretation, by attending to the formal aspects of literature and
attempting to work out what they might really mean, and in the process, focus on arriving at better
and more detailed interpretations, overall, striving for more informed readings of the great works.
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Addendum: Nussbaum and Contemporary Philosophy
Nussbaum argues against the form and content of the way most moral and political philosophy
expresses itself: (1) The form of the abstract argumentative treatise; (2) and its content, the
exclusive and general concern with rules and abstract principles.
She argues against Kant's Moral Law ethics and M i l l ' s Utilitarianism, both are forms of
essentialist ethics that engage in the reduction of the whole range of human vales to a single value
that is expressed in a general principle. Her work is clearly about the emotions, and, to draw a stark
contrast between the type of philosophy that Nussbaum is advocating and the type of philosophy
that is all too characteristic of much of modern philosophy (most particularly from the Analytic
tradition), 1 present a passage from W. Newton-Smith's "A Conceptual Investigation of Love":
Having defined the field of investigation, we can now sketch the concepts analytically
presupposed in our use of 'love.' An idea of these concepts can be gained by sketching a
sequence of relations, the members of which we take as relevant in deciding whether or not
some relationship exists between person A and B is one of love. These are not relative in
the sense of being evidence for some further relation of love but as being, in part at least,
the material of which love consists. The sequence would include at least the following:
(1) A knows B (or at least knows something of B)
(2) A cares (is concerned) about B
A likes B
(3) A respects B
A is attracted to B
A feels affection for B
(4) A is committed to B

A wishes to see B's welfare promoted.
The connection between these relations which we call "love comprising relations" or LCRs'
is not, except for 'knowing about' and possibly "Feels attraction for,' as tight as strict
entailment.
As quoted from John Horton's article, "Life, literature, and Ethical Theory: Martha Nussbaum and
the Role of Literary Imagination in Ethical Thought," from Literature and the Political
Imagination (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 70-98.

